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Introduction: Rationalization in Religions
Philosopher Carl Friedrich Gethmann, a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg 
Academy, has described rationalization as the “targeted, structured and reproduc-
ible operation of optimization.”1 Gethmann’s broad definition covers rationaliza-
tion across a range of very different areas – in the economy, in society, even in 
the mind of the individual. In our own field of religious studies, the first scholar 
who comes to mind in this context is the philosopher and sociologist Max Weber, 
who introduced the term “rationalization” to the field.2 Maintaining that religious 
rationalization preceded social rationalization, Weber identified rationalization 
structures within the Judeo-Christian tradition that, as Gethmann puts it, “encour-
aged the establishment of rational conceptions of the world and the emergence of 
a modern consciousness.”3 In his studies of the “economic ethics of the world reli-
gions,” Weber developed the notion of a universal historical process of “disenchant-
ment” (Entzauberung4) of the religious-metaphysical conceptions of the world and 
argued for a “unidirectional rationalization of all world religions.” According to 
Weber, all paths of religious rationalization lead towards an understanding of 
the world that is purified of magical notions. Only the occidental path of develop-
ment, however, leads to a fully decentralized understanding of the world.5
It is not my intention, at this juncture, to provide a full recapitulation of 
Weber’s view of the rationalization that is inherent in all world religions. His 
basic assumptions concerning an occidental rationalism, and thus a particularly 
marked rationalism in the occidental religions, which he set against the Orient 
and its religions,6 appear highly problematic to us today. In view of the obvious 
problems in Weber’s conceptualization, I believe it makes more sense, in talking 
about “rationalization in religions,” to stick with Gethmann’s definition of ration-
alization and to speak of an optimization of the “rationality” of religion. But what 
is rationality? I turn again to Gethmann, who defines “rationality” as “developing 
processes for the discursive upholding of claims to validity, to follow these and to 
1 Gethmann 1995a:463. The following introductory remarks are based on the greetings I deliv-
ered as Vice President of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy to the participants in the Berlin con-
ference on “Rationalization in Religions” on which this volume is based.
2 Schluchter 2016:22–42, 127–261.
3 Gethmann 1995a:463.
4 Weber 1994:22 and 2001:273; cf. also Joas 2017:201–277 and Schluchter 2009:1–17.
5 Habermas1981.
6 Weber 1984:9–11; cf. Schluchter 2016:192–196.
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avail of them.”7 A religion becomes rationalized when its exponents argue discur-
sively – that is, in line with contemporary standards of rationality – in favor of its 
claims to validity, and when those claims to validity can be asserted in this way, 
instead of authoritatively and using instruments of power.
Notwithstanding our criticism of Weber, we are left with the question of 
whether such a tendency is actually inherent in all world religions, and whether 
this development intensifies over time. The conference on which the present 
volume is based set out to address this question, focusing mainly on Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, aside from Shaul Shaked’s treatment of Zoroastrianism. 
Many of the papers focus specifically on the formative periods in which these 
three religions (sometimes referred to as “Abrahamic”) came into contact with 
the “cultures of rationality” that surrounded them, leading them to develop 
independent philosophies, theologies or at least argumentations with the pagan 
culture of rationality on the basis of their respective Holy Scriptures.
To an extent, Berlin can be described as a hot spot for this kind of research into 
the formative periods of the Abrahamic faiths. In the area of Judaism, for example, 
one could mention the studies of Peter Schäfer of Berlin (and Princeton), who 
convened several conferences, the results of which have since been published, to 
examine the relationships between the Greco-Roman culture of rationality and 
the large corpuses of rabbinic literature.8 Regarding Islam, we might point to the 
Berlin research of Islamic studies scholar Sabine Schmidtke, also of (Berlin and) 
Princeton, whose paper “Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in the Medieval 
World of Islam”9 was part of a larger project funded by the European Research 
Council – the groundwork for which, however, was laid down by several research 
groups at the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies, to which our Jerusalem col-
leagues, such as Sarah Stroumsa, made a considerable contribution.10 In the area 
of Early Christianity, we may note the studies of the reception of the Alexandrian 
culture of knowledge, and especially of (neo) Platonic philosophy, among Alex-
andrian Christians such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen; this work, too, has 
taken place in Berlin, within the circle surrounding the edition of the works of 
these Early Christian thinkers, in particular at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy, 
but of course not only there.11
7 Gethmann 1995b:468. For a different way of understanding the term, see Schluchter 2015:519–
525.
8 Schäfer 1998–2002.
9 For details and a bibliography (including open-access publications) see: https://cordis.europa.
eu/project/rcn/88937_en.html (accessed May 5, 2018).
10 See Schmidtke et al. 2007.
11 See Markschies 2007.
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A number of efforts have recently been made to analyze and compare these 
attempts – facilitated by the continued existence in Late Antiquity of a culture of 
knowledge with shared standards of rationality – to integrate a culture of knowl-
edge and rationality into the respective religions; worth mentioning here, for 
example, are the publications of Guy Stroumsa.12 These comparative approaches 
are, of course, still in their nascent stages, with studies of “rationalization in reli-
gions” generally limited to one of the three – Judaism, Christianity or Islam – not 
to mention certain limitations in their perspectives (for example, because of the 
way reception has developed in modern times, the significance of Platonism has 
been afforded more attention than that of the Stoic tradition).
An earlier collaborative effort to examine “Religion and Rationality” was 
undertaken at a conference with that title held in Berlin in 2009.13 That confer-
ence took a closer look at the relationship between scripture and rationalization 
– that is, between normative texts and efforts to adapt reflective work on them to 
contemporary standards of rationality. The colloquium’s thesis was that interpre-
tation, particularly in the form of scientific commentaries, is a literary medium 
and institutional method for approaching holy texts that makes it possible to 
arrive at rationalizations in accord with a methodically controlled procedure. The 
colloquium took a very broad comparative approach, classifying Marxist texts 
alongside ancient oriental ones as “Scriptures” in the terms of a phenomeno-
logical approach to religion. The question already arose there as to whether a 
phenomenological comparison of the possibly differing potentials of religions to 
rationalize their traditions, and of their possibly differing strategies, would have 
to look not only at interpreting Holy Scriptures but also at theological reflections 
that are not presented in the form of commentary.
While we might tremble today to sketch broad outlines and model clear 
structures like those proposed by Weber, perhaps we can nevertheless create a 
list of criteria to outline how rationalization might be practiced by those actively 
involved in religions (such as religious experts or theologians). I would like to 
mention a few questions that might be helpful in this regard:
– What factors promote/impede rationalization?
– From where are the criteria for rationalization drawn, and how are they 
applied?
– In what institutions does rationalization take place, and where is it critiqued?
12 See G. Stroumsa 2013.
13 For the papers presented there, see Kablitz and Markschies 2013. We are indebted to the Fritz 
Thyssen Foundation for its part in funding both that conference and the one on which this vol-
ume is based.
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– What circles of proponents propagate, support and utilize rationalization?
– Does the friction between clergy and other theologians that is so characteris-
tic of Christianity exist in other religions as well?
The papers presented herein offer a historical perspective on these and other 
questions, along with some answers.
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